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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates whether one’s effort to keep up with the Joneses has
any effect on labor supply behavior. We provide a simple model and
empirical evidence that labor supply decisions of married women are
influenced by relative as well as absolute income of their husbands. We find,
after controlling for husbands’ absolute income and other individual
characteristics, that married women are more likely to be in labor force when
their husbands’ relative income is low. Results are robust across various
settings and measures of relative income and the size of the effect is
economically meaningful. We also show that income inequality of reference
group of husbands in age-regional cross sections can be a predictor of their
wives’ labor supply.
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1. Introduction
Do relative income concerns affect human behavior? If so, do they count enough to
influence labor supply? There is a growing literature with empirical evidence that
supports the “relative income” hypothesis, which argues that individuals are adversely
affected when they perceive themselves to be economically deprived relative to their
peers. Clark and Oswald (1996) for example found that the satisfaction levels reported by
British workers (in the British Household Panel Survey) vary inversely with the wage
levels of peers. Alesina, Di Tella and MacCulloch (2003) found that individuals have a
lower tendency to report themselves happy when inequality of the country (or, in the
case of the US, state) is high. Luttmer (2004) and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005) show that
higher earnings of neighbors are associated with lower levels of self-reported happiness,
using individual-level panel data. Given this strong and body of evidence on comparisonbased utility functions, it is natural to ask whether the sense of relative deprivation is
strong enough to affect economic decisions and therefore to be a predictor of actual
economic behavior.
This paper attempts to answer the question by examining the effect of relative income on
labor supply behavior. Our model of the choice of work hours, presented in the next
section, captures the relative income concern by taking account of the influence of the
consumption of the well-to-do on the marginal utility of own consumption for the lesswell-off. The main result is that an individual’s labor supply is increasing in the degree of
the relative deprivation of her family. We then examine this hypothesis by asking
whether a wife’s labor force participation (LFP) decision depends on her husband’s
relative income among his peers. We focus on this specific relationship because the
husband’s relative income among peers provides an exogenous measure of relative
income that is not affected by the LFP decision of his wife. Using the March Current
Population Survey from 1969 to 1979, we first show that a wife’s LFP decision is
increasing in the relative deprivation of a husband among his reference group, which is
defined using a combination of characteristics including both State and Census Region of
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residence, race and age. Our results indicate that, even after controlling for individual
characteristics, husband’s income, and reference group effects, relative deprivation of the
husband is positively associated with LFP of his wife. Its effects are significant, and
estimates are robust across a variety of settings. In the later part of this paper, we show
that the effect of relative income concerns can also be captured by local income
inequality measures. We also show that middle class wives are more sensitive to the
relative income concerns than those whose husbands belong to either high- or lowincome groups.
There are a few previous papers that have examined the role of relative income in labor
supply. Stark and Taylor (1989, 1991) found that relative income plays a significant role
in international migration from Mexico to United States. Controlling for absolute income
and expected gains from migration, the propensity of households to participate in
international migration is directly related to the household’s relative income ranking.
Neumark and Postlewaite (1998) studied the labor supply decisions of relatives, finding
some evidence that women whose sister’s husband had a higher income than their own
husband were more likely to be employed. Bowles and Park (2003) showed that the
greater inequality predicts longer average work hours, using country-level macro data on
work hours of manufacturing employees in ten OECD countries.
This paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, we provide a
comprehensive test of relative income effect on labor supply using both individual and
regional-level measures of relative income and much larger micro-level sample than
previous studies. After carefully controlling the possibility of endogeneity between
relative income and labor supply, we provide direct evidence that relative income effect
is a general phenomenon that can be observed at a much larger scale and over a sustained
period of time, which we believe is crucial for the validity of relative income as a
predictor of labor supply. Second, this paper provides empirical evidence that relative
income effects are asymmetric and mostly up-wards; this means that less well-off
individuals’ well-being is negatively influenced by the fact that their income is lower
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than that of their reference group, while richer individuals do not get happier from having
an income above the average. Third, this paper presents relative income of a husband as a
new factor in a married woman’s LFP decision. While many studies examined the
relationship between husbands’ income and labor supply of their wives, to date few
studies look at husbands’ relative income. In addition, we show that the income
comparison effect among sisters observed by Neumark and Postlewaite (1998) can be
applied to much more broadly defined reference groups of non-relatives. Lastly, this
paper contrasts with a couple of recent studies that investigate the correlation between the
inequality in wage distribution and workers’ effort from a very different perspective.
Lander, Rebitzer and Taylor (1996) have suggested that inequality induces longer work
hours because those who work longer attain a higher percentile rank in the wage
distribution at the workplace, and the more that the wage distribution is unequal, the
greater the wage gains implied by an increase in rank. Bell and Freeman (2001) provide
convincing evidence for this effect: In the U.S. and Germany wage inequality within
detailed occupation/industry cells is positively correlated with work hours for those
working thirty-five hours per week and longer. In these studies, however, income
inequality is a reflection of unequal rewards between desirable and undesirable acts that
are designed to maximize workers effort and work hours. This paper provides a direct test
of relative income effect that can be clearly distinguished from the rat-race model: Wives'
labor force participation covarying with her husband’s relative income (and regional
income inequality) cannot plausibly be capturing the Bell and Freeman (2001) type
incentive effects, unless we have a reason to believe that having a wife with a job has
positive implication on a husband’s promotion.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the main idea and
presents a simple model. Section 3 describes empirical strategy and sample that we used
and section 4 estimates the labor market participation equation and presents the results.
Section 5 concludes.
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2. A Model of Relative Income Concerns

Veblen (1934) held that consumption is motivated by a desire for social standing as well
as for the enjoyment of the goods and services per se. His key idea was that the best-off
members of a community -- “the leisure class” -- establish the standards for the rest.
The following model embodies the two propositions underlying Veblen’s account,
namely that people compare consumption (or wealth) but not leisure, and that they refer
upwards, choosing their work and spending activities so as to be more like a higher
income group, rather than seeking social distance from lower income groups.1 Suppose
married women differ in some trait that influences (potential) hourly wages and that they
choose their hours of work (m) to maximize a utility function. The arguments of the
utility function are leisure (which we normalize as 1-m) and what we term effective
consumption, c*, defined as a function of consumption level of the family (c) minus a
constant v (for Veblen) times the consumption level of some higher income family (c~).
How reference groups are formed and dissolved is a complicated issued that we will
discuss in detail in the next section. Here, we assume those who live in the same
geographical region and who are of similar age form the relevant reference group. In
terms of income, the individual’s reference group might be the very rich, or it might be an
intermediate group. The reference group’s rank in the income distribution is taken as
exogenous, as is the Veblen constant v. Together, the reference group and v measure the
nature and intensity of the relevant social comparisons. Individuals do not save, so c =
n

∑w m
i

i

where wi is the wage rate of member i of the family and n is the size of the

i =1

family (mi=0 if the individual i is not employed). Effective consumption now becomes an
income gap between reference group and the family in question. Assuming that one’s
1

Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005) provides empirical evidence that income comparisons are mostly up-wards. She
finds that poorer individuals’ well-being is negatively influenced by the fact that their income is lower than
that of their reference group, while richer individuals do not get happier from having an income above the
average.
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utility from consumption depends on total consumption of the family, for a married
woman i who is not in the richest group we have

ui = u(c*, mi)

(1)

n −1

ui = u[( ∑ w j m j + w i m i − vc ~ ), mi]
j =1

where ui is increasing and concave in its first argument and decreasing and convex in the
second. Leisure and consumption are complements, so uc*m<0. The effect of increased
consumption by members of the reference group thus is both to lower the utility of the
individual and to raise the marginal utility of effective consumption. The woman will join
labor force if mi*, namely that which equates the marginal rate of substitution between
leisure and effective consumption to the wage rate, is positive.2

We can now consider the effects of an increase in income gap on labor supply decision of
a housewife (whose mi*≤0 currently) by raising c~ relative to income of all other family
n −1

members ( ∑ w j m j ). Differentiating the individual's first order condition for the choice
j =1

of work hours (and using the second order condition) we find that dmi*/dc~ has the sign of
-(uc*c* +uc*m), which is positive. The effect of the larger gap between the consumption
levels of the individual and the reference group is to raise the marginal utility of
consumption relative to the marginal utility of leisure, which may induce the woman to
join the labor market. Variations in the Veblen constant have the same sign: dmi*/dv>0
reflecting an increase in the intensity of social comparison and perhaps capturing the
negative effect of TV watching on saving in Schor (1998). It is readily shown that if, in
2

If the utility function is Cobb-Douglas in leisure and effective consumption (with a the coefficient of c*
n −1
and (1- a) the coefficient of (1-m)) then the choice of hours is such that mi*/(1-mi*) = a/(1-a) + ( w j m j -

∑

j =1

vc~)/wi(1-mi) with the increased hours indicated by the second term on the right hand side representing the
Veblen effect.
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contrast to this model, the reference group were the poor (others seeking to distance
themselves from the reference group) then an increase in inequality would induce a

reduction in work hours, giving us an unambiguous and empirically testable hypothesis
distinct from seeking distance from the poor, or social comparisons generally.

3. Empirical Strategy

To test the hypothesis, we need to find an exogenous measure of relative income c* that
is not affected by mi*. Otherwise, due to the feedback effect of mi* changes on the
income gap, we will get a biased measure of relative income effect on labor supply. The
concern about the endogenous relative income is addressed in two ways. First, we
examine the correlation between a husband’s relative income among his peers and LFP of
his wife. Suppose relative income of a husband has fallen compared to his reference
group without any changes in his absolute income. Assuming that husband’s reference
group is closely tied to the reference group of his family, the model presented in the
previous section predicts an increase in labor supply by his wife (dmi*/dc~>0). And yet,
the feedback effect of the wife’s LFP decision on relative income of the husband will be
limited because the relative income depends on the wage rate and work hours of the
husband and other men, not of his wife. Second, to eliminate cases in which a husband
quits his job or become a part-time worker after his wife joined the labor force, we limit
the sample to wives of full-time, full-year workers.3
We also need to consider the possibility of group-level correlation caused by substitution
of male workers by female workers. Topel (1992) suggests that growing supply of skilled
women might contribute to the rising inequality among male workers by substituting for
less skilled male workers and reducing their wages. However, Juhn and Kim (1999) show
3

Though it is possible to reduce work hours without becoming a part-time worker, many full time workers
face "trap-door floors", that they may be denied the opportunity to reduce their hours and instead face a
choice between full-time employment and quitting the job. (Drago, Black and Wooden, 2004) Stewart and
Swaffield (1997) also show that workers may not choose their hours of work freely by showing that more
than a third of British men work longer than they would wish at the prevailing wage.
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that women had not made a greater contribution to labor in the higher-skill categories
until 1980s4. Therefore, by limiting the sample to 1970s, we minimize the possibility of
an endogenous connection between income inequality of men and LFP of married
women.
Limiting sample to 1970s has two additional advantages. First, since the cultural
presumption that men were supposed to be the breadwinner for a family was still strong
at that time, it is even less likely that LFP of a wife would affect a husband’s job and
relative income. Second, it was a period when employment of married women increased
very rapidly and married women with a job became a majority.
Table 1. Overtime Changes in Women’s Labor Market Participation in 1970’s
Age Group
16-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
All

1969
46.06
36.90
45.37
48.03
35.31
47.64

1979
60.02
56.96
60.19
54.55
37.18
58.79

Change
(1969 - 1979)
13.96
20.06
14.82
6.52
1.87
11.15

As shown in Table 1, between 1969 and 1979 labor market entry of prime age married
women (aged 25 to 44) increased by 20% and 14.8% respectively. It is therefore
interesting to see whether this rapid increase can be explained by the relative income
effect.

To capture the changes in the 1970’s, we use 11 years of Current Population Survey
March data from 1969 to 1979. The March supplement has several clear advantages. It is
a large and nationally representative sample, the quality of income data exceeds that of
most other surveys, and it provides geographic identifiers at the level of the Census
4

According to Juhn and Kim (1999), demand shift, not supply of educated women, is the main reason for
the rising inequality among men in 1980s. They show that evidence that college-graduate women may be
substitutes for high school drop out or graduate men in the 1980s is weak at best. Moreover, they show that
when demand shift measures are allowed to play a larger role and entered as a separate regressor, the
substitution between these two groups disappears.
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division and state. This allows us to construct measures of income inequality at multiple
geographic levels (Census geographic division and States). We limit the sample to white
women because minorities are severely under-represented in 1970s CPS and crossreference between races is likely to have been weaker in the 1970s when racial
segregation was still prevalent. As noted above, women with a part-time working
husband are excluded from the sample to minimize the possibility of reverse causality
and the resulting sample of white, working aged men (including not married)5 contains
414,439 individual observations and the married women sample contains 101,303
observations across the 11 years of the survey.
3. 1 Reference Group:
Difficulty in this type of research has always been that it is hard to know how individuals
define their reference group. The social psychology literature suggests that members of
one's reference group are typically selected on the basis of either similarity or geographic
proximity (Singer, 1981). While there is no perfect formula for determining reference
groups, various studies report that individuals define reference groups along demographic
lines such as sex, education, and race (Merton and Kitt, 1950; Singer, 1981; Bylsma and
Major, 1994). In this paper, we define reference groups as those who are geographically
close and of the same race and of similar age. For the geographical closeness, we use
both census geographical regions and States as criteria. One problem with using States is
that until 1979 not all States are identified in CPS. As a result, the twenty-one States and
Census Bureau Geodivision groups of States that are consistently identifiable are used
instead.

For the age similarity, we divided the data set into five-year age groups (20-24, 25-29,
30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, 55-59, 60-64) and calculated the within-age group
5

Single men are included since we could not think of any reason why married men should exclude
unmarried men from their reference group. Also, inclusion of unmarried men makes the measures of
earning inequality more reliable by increasing the size of primary sampling unit.
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inequality of men living in the same area. The purpose of controlling age is twofold.
First, we believe that reference between men of similar age may be stronger than it would
be between men of different ages. Second, and more importantly, controlling age allows
us to eliminate a potential link between future income and measures of income inequality.
Without age control, measures of income inequality pick up the income difference
between men of different age groups living in the region and may reflect the difference
between the present and future income level.6 Given that husbands’ future income may
have a stronger negative income effect on their wives’ employment than the current
income (Shaw 1992), it is necessary to control age to minimize the correlation between
income inequality measures and future income level.
As a result, a 33 year-old man who lived in California during the sample years, for
example, is assigned to a cell made of men aged between 30 and 34 and living in
California (or Pacific region in case of Census Geodivision analysis), and we calculate
his relative income in the group using two different measures of relative deprivation. In
addition, three (weighted) measures of income inequality among the cell members are
calculated.7 Average cell size per year is 152.67 observations for State/age group cells
and 339.71 observations for region/age group cells.
3. 2 Measures of Relative Income
Based on the seminal definition of relative deprivation of Runciman (1966), Stark and
Taylor (1989) define relative deprivation index as follows:

(2)

RDi = [E(y|y>yi) - yi]·prob(y>yi)

6

Indeed, the key operating assumption linking labor supply to inequality in Bell and Freeman (2000) is the
notion that pay inequality provides an indicator or measure of the future income stream influenced by
current work hours.
7
This way of calculating a local level inequality is commonly used in many other studies (Ferrer-iCarbonell, 2004, Eibner and Evans, 2004) including Bell and Freeman (2001), in which they used detailed
occupation/industry cells to measure the wage inequality in the cells.
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which is the product of the mean excess income of those with higher income than yi and
the proportion of individuals in the group with higher income than i’s income. (For a
proof and analysis of the more general form, see Stark and Taylor 1989) If all rankings
are left intact, any increase in the income of a household richer than household i will
increase the relative deprivation of household i, whereas any ranking gain by household i
will reduce the relative deprivation of household i.

One concern with this measure is that it is sensitive to changes in absolute income. As
Eibner and Evans (2004) pointed out, if everyone’s income doubles, for example, RDi
will double as well. This may pose a problem since we look at relative deprivation over a
ten-year span, even though incomes were adjusted for inflation and average income has
not increased over the period. To suppress the effect of absolute income changes, we
construct a measure of relative deprivation by substituting log income instead of nominal
income that are used in equation (2).

A second measure of relative income is the individual’s z-score from Eibner and Evans
(2004), which measures the number of standard deviations the individual’s own income
is above (or below) the reference group mean.
z-score =

( yi − µ r )

σr

where µr and σr are the reference group mean and standard deviation. While this measure
also captures relative income, it is different from the relative deprivation index in that it is
sensitive to changes in the income of those whose income is lower than i’s income.
Further, while relative deprivation decreases as one’s relative income increases, z-score
will increase. Therefore, we should expect negative coefficient z-scores. Table 2 reports
summary statistics of relative income variables of Census region cells and State level
cells and other explanatory variables by year, and those of a merged sample.
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3.3 Regression Equation
In the logit regression model, the dependent variable takes on the value of 1 if person i is
in a labor market at the time of survey and 0 otherwise. A logit criterion equation for
women’s LFP is
LFPit = β 0 + β 1 q j + β 2 x j + λ j + T t + G j + u it
t

it

t

where a married woman i is either seeking or has a job if LFPit >0. q j is the relative
deprivation index or other measure of inequality for region/age group cell j at time t; x it
is a vector of other possible individual level explanatory variables with β 2 its vector of
estimated coefficients; λ j is a regional fixed effect; G j is husband’s age-group fixed
effect; Tt is time fixed effect; u it is an error term. The explanatory variables x it include a
list of human capital variables typically found in studies of women’s labor supply. These
include husband information (husband’s income, age and education in years), wife
information (wife’s age, age squared and age cubed, education in years, educational
dummy variables), and family characteristics (number of children under 1, 3 and 18 years
old, size of the family). Also, state-level unemployment rate is added to capture the labor
market situation of the region. As we can see from Table 2, demographic variables
clearly show the changes in family structure (falling fertility rate, decreasing family size)
and women’s human capital (a rise in schooling level) that are widely cited to have
contributed to the growth in women’s labor supply. Lastly, a quadratic initial relative
deprivation term is included in the regression equation. Although our theory predicts that
the relative income variable in the LFP decision function will have a positive effect on
LFP propensities, at incomes near or below subsistence level, relative income
considerations may not matter as much as concerns for mere survival. These
considerations may erode the measured positive impact of relative deprivation at the low-
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income level. A quadratic initial relative deprivation term may be able to capture this
potential nonlinearity.

4. Estimated Results

4.1 Basic Results
Table 3 reports the estimated effects of relative deprivation index and z-score from logit
models of women’s labor market participation. Marginal effects (instead of logit
coefficients) are reported and the standard errors are based on robust variance estimates
that control for the clustering of observations within a reference group.
After controlling for individual attributes and local labor market condition, coefficients of
both measures of relative income have the expected sign and are statistically significant.
The coefficients are largest in the Census Region/age-group model, where one standard
deviation increase of the relative deprivation index from index = 0 will increase the
chance of a wife’s LFP by 4.58%, compared to 3.1% in the State/age-group cell. In case
of z-scores, the coefficient is negative as expected and one standard deviation increase
from mean income (z=0) for a husband appears to decrease the probability for his wife to
join labor force by about 4.4%(State/age cell) or 5.1%(Census Region/age cell).
Considering that one standard deviation increase in the unemployment rate in the region
reduces women’s labor market participation by about 1.07% in the same regression, these
are sizeable results. It is also true, however, that one standard deviation movement in
relative deprivation is a large change. For the RD index, one standard deviation increase
is slightly bigger than the average difference in RD index between 25-29 age-group
(0.340) and 55-59 age-group (0.767).

The significant effect on square terms of both the relative-deprivation and z-score shows
that correlation between income inequality and women’s LFP becomes weaker as
husband’s income decrease. For example, one standard deviation increase of RD index
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from its mean value is calculated to have only negligible (0.4% decrease) effect on
women’s LFP. We can think of two possible explanations for this nonlinearity: First, it
may simply mean that relative income concern is not an important factor in women’s LFP
decision, which is consistent with what Alesina, Di Tella and MacCulloch (2003) found
in their happiness research, namely that the group whose happiness seems to be most
adversely affected by inequality is the rich (those who belong to the top two income
quartile) while the poor (those who belong to the bottom two income quartile) seem
unaffected by inequality. However, the weaker correlation may reflect poor job prospect
(and lower expected wage) for low income wives, namely that, due to matching effect,
lower income of a husband may be a proxy for lower market wage and lower changes of
finding a job for his wife. The fact that husband’s absolute income also has non-linear
relationship with his wife’s LFP suggests the presence of matching effect.
Lastly, this result also indicates that our result is not driven by substitution of male
workers by more skilled female workers, as the correlation between LFP of women and
relative deprivation should be stronger among low-income male workers if the
substitution effect were driving our results.

4.2 Alternative Explanations
The fact that women’s LFP is correlated with their husbands’ relative income may have
some other explanations. At the very least, we want to control for other factors that
influence women’s LFP to verify that they are not responsible for our findings.
One alternative explanation is that the results are driven by unobserved local
characteristics that are correlated with both LFP of women and relative income of her
husband. For example, one would expect high-income area to have positive amenities
such as better schools and less crime. Due to positive amenities and high income level,
cost of living may be higher in that region than other areas and it may put more married
women in the area into labor force. If average income and measured income inequalities
are positively correlated, cost of living may be a contributing factor to our results.
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Similarly, one may expect that living in a metropolitan area might play a role since
women living in city may get more job opportunities and income differences in
metropolitan area may be higher than other non-MSA area.
However, simple correlation between measures of income inequality and mean income is
weak (correlation coefficient between mean income of a cell and the relative deprivation
index = 0.258 and z-score = -0.1003) and within age-group correlation is even smaller
(ranging from 0.017 to 0.093 depending on age-group in case of RD Index). Also, within
age-group correlation between mean income and women’s LFP is very weak and mostly
negative (ranging from -0.12 to 0.024 depending on age-group). Lastly, when we include
dummy variables for each reference group at each point in time to control reference
group effect, the coefficients on relative income measures actually increase slightly and
remain statistically significant (column I of Table 4), discounting the possibility that our
results are driven by cross-regional correlation between mean and relative income or any
kind of inter-reference group correlation.
In case of MSA, women’s LFP rate in non-MSA area is actually higher (average=0.509)
than Central City area (average=0.459) and income inequality is also slightly higher in
non-MSA area (0.6387 in Central City, 0.7058 in non-SMSA) but differences are not
statistically significant. The second column of Table 5 estimates the reference group
fixed effect regression with dummy variables for MSA status. The coefficients on relative
income measures remain significant and similar in magnitude, which indicates that our
results are not driven by MSA status.8
Another possibility is that our results may be driven by husband’s job characteristics that
may affect both his relative income and LFP decision of his wife. The last set of
regressions includes dummy variables for husband’s two-digit occupation and industry
codes to control husbands’ job/industry characteristics. All the signs of coefficients on

8

For further test, we dividied sample according to MSA status and ran separate regressions for each subsample. The result (not shown) showed that relative income effect is stronger in ‘balance of SMSA’ and
‘Non-SMSA’ area than central cities.
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relative income remain the same and similar in magnitude, which discounts the
possibility that husbands’ job characteristics are driving our results.

Table 4.
I

II

III

0.171**
(7.18)
-0.112**
(-14.02)
0.135**
(5.70)
-0.095**
(-11.95)

0.165**
(6.89)
-0.111**
(-13.78)
0.130**
(5.45)
-0.094**
(-11.71)

0.148**
(7.02)
-0.097**
(-12.43)
0.122**
(6.61)
-0.083**
(-11.25)

-0.169**
(-13.13)
0.014**
(9.12)
-0.170**
(-13.01)
0.013**
(8.87)

-0.143**
(-11.39)
0.012**
(8.50)
-0.129**
(-11.04)
0.011**
(8.20)

Relative Deprivation Index
Census Region Index
Census Region Index_Squared
State Index
State Index_Squared
Z-Score
-0.169**
(-13.04)
Census Region Z-Score squared/10
0.014**
(9.08)
State Z-Score
-0.170**
(-13.01)
State Z-Score squared/10
0.013**
(8.87)
t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Census Region Z-Score

4.3 Income Inequality as a Predictor
A number of studies have reported that local-level income measures (such as mean
income and income inequality) have sizable effects on self-reported happiness. Moreover,
Bell and Freeman (2001) and Bowles and Park (2004) have demonstrated a strong
statistical correlation between income inequality and labor supply using group level
income inequality measures. In this section, we examine whether a positive correlation
between income inequality and labor supply can also be found between husbands and
wives.
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We employ three measures of income inequality.9 Firstly, based on Veblen’s idea that the
Joneses, with whom one had to keep up, were not the usual neighbors but the rich ones,10
we chose the ratio of the highest income in 90th percentile (that dividing the 90th from
the 91st percentile) to the highest income in the 50th percentile, as the key measure of
income inequality. The ratio (P90/P50) averages 1.814 across states over the time period,
and ranges from 1.405 to 2.678. We also measure the coefficient of variation (CV), which
is designed to capture the effect of overall changes in income inequality. The third
measure of income inequality is the ratio of the 50th percentile and 10th percentile of
income (P50/P10). It is included to see whether a ‘falling bottom’ has any influence on
women’s employment.11 If our analysis is correct, the coefficients of P90/P50 and CV
will be positive.

The coefficient of regional income inequality regressions reported in Table 5 and 6 show
similar pattern with relative income regression though weaker. The coefficients of CV
and P90/50 are both positive and the coefficient of CV is statistically significant at 5%,
though that of P90/P50 is significant at 10% level in Census Level Sample and not
significant in State Sample. The coefficient of the P50/P10 index is statistically
significant and negative, which is also consistent with the individual-level results.
However, magnitudes of these inequality variables are weaker than that of individuallevel relative income measures. A standard deviation change in the P90/P50 ratio and the
CV is associated with only 0.4 to 0.5 percentage point increase in women’s LFP,
respectively (based on Census region sample regression).

9

To construct each measure, we used the total income of the last year variable and weighted each
observation by the weights provided in the CPS.
10
“…[The] standard of expenditure which commonly guides our effort is not the average, ordinary
expenditure already achieved; it is an ideal of consumption that lies just beyond our reach, or to reach
which requires some strain….It is for this class [the wealthy leisure class] to determine, in general outline,
what scheme of life the community shall accept as decent or honorific; and it is their office by precept and
example to set forth this scheme of social salvation in its highest, ideal form.” (Veblen, p.103-4)
11
Bosch (1999) suggests that falling wages of low skilled male workers may have induced longer work
hours and growth of married women’s labor-force participation.
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Similarity between individual-level and local-level results can also be found when we
divide the sample into three different income groups – upper (husband’s income>P90),
middle (P50<husband’s income<P90) and low (husband’s income<P50) - and then
compare the coefficient of income inequality measures in each samples. Individual-level
results suggest that the tie between LFP of married women and income inequality among
men might be stronger among those whose make more than median income. As we can
see from Table 6, middle-income group results show stronger marginal effects for both
the P90/P50 ratio and CV than the results from merged sample. Coefficients of both
measures show significant increase from Table 5 and marginal effects also have
significantly increased to 0.93% change per one standard deviation increase of P90/P50
ratio. Second, results from other income groups also support the hypothesis.
Table 5. Effects of Men’s Income Inequality on Women’s Labor Supply
Census Geodivision
P90/P50 of Men’s Income

0.0272

†

(1.71)
CV of Men’s Income

0.0729

0.0194
(1.62)

*

(2.07)
P50/P10 of Men’s Income

State

-0.0089

0.0735**
(2.96)

*

-0.0044†

(2.35)
(1.78)
Observations
101303
101303
t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering. In addition to individual variables, all
the regressions include regional, year and husband’s age-group dummy variables.
†
significant at 10% * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

As we can see from column 5 and 6 of Table 6, wives of both high and low-income
husbands are not affected by P90/P50 ratio at all. The marginal effects of the CV and all
other P90/P50 ratio are reduced substantially and become insignificant in these samples,
which suggests that wives of medium income earners are the driving force of relative
income effect. Lastly, it is interesting to see that the P50/P10 percentile ratio is
insignificant to women with high- and low-income husbands and has a negative effect on
mid-income husbands. As noted in the previous section, this outcome may suggest that
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wives of low-income husbands may be more affected by necessity and other variables
than relative income concerns.12

5. Conclusion
Researchers in the social science are increasingly concerned about the effect of relative
income and income inequality on people’s happiness and well-being. Yet studies of these
relationships are difficult to conduct and not always convincing because of some
skepticism toward self-reported measures of well-being. (see Bertrand and Mullainathan,
2001 for example) In this paper, we provide evidence on how relative income and
income inequality affect actual behavior of people and show that the results are
consistent with studies on well-being. We find that there is a positive and statistically
significant link between relative income of a man and the probability for his wife to be in
labor market. We investigate the concern that this finding could be driven by omitted
variables but could not find any evidence. We find similar link using income inequality
measures, namely that a married woman is more likely to be in labor market as regional
income inequality increases. In both cases, correlation between relative income measures
and women’s LFP becomes weaker as husband’s income falls below average, which may
suggest that middle class wives are more sensitive to relative income effects than those
who are poor.
Lastly, our results suggest that relative income effects on labor supply are asymmetrical:
if the reference group were the poor and the well-off seek to distance themselves from the
reference group then an increase in relative income (and regional inequality) would
induce a reduction in work hours. Many researchers have argued (Dusenberry, 1949,
Irelend, 2001, Bowles and Park, 2004) that if the asymmetry holds, then it may offer real
support for progressive taxation. While our results pose an interesting complication
because more married women entering labor market is not necessarily a bad thing, we
12

This result is consistent with Stark and Taylor (1989) who show that the effect of relative deprivation
variable on migration is not linear.
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provide support for the potential policy relevance of empirical information on the relative
income effect.
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Table 2. Summary Statistics
Labor Force Participation
Census Region
RD Index
Z-Score
P90/P50
P50/P10
Coeff. Of Variance

ALL
0.479
(0.500)

1969
0.401
(0.490)

1979
0.583
(0.493)

1969-1979
0.182

0.576
(0.441)
0.172
(0.926)
1.814
(0.184)
2.581
(0.942)
0.605
(0.077)

0.539

0.561

0.022

0.127
(0.905)
1.770
(0.179)
2.231
(0.689)
0.598
(0.086)

0.172
(0.916)
1.846
(0.177)
2.836
(0.539)
0.601
(0.059)

0.045

0.533

0.554

0.021

0.132
(0.908)
1.668
(0.178)
2.093
(0.510)
0.514
(0.086)
9.977
(0.583)
0.032
(0.009)
0.080
(0.275)
0.274
(0.520)
2.317
(1.525)
4.521
(1.596)
34.326
(5.876)
11.908
(2.419)
0.718
(0.450)
0.100
(0.300)

0.172
(0.916)
1.752
(0.177)
2.618
(0.675)
0.528
(0.054)
9.944
(0.667)
0.053
(0.010)
0.080
(0.274)
0.258
(0.494)
1.824
(1.270)
4.046
(1.362)
33.536
(5.597)
12.671
(2.576)
0.831
(0.375)
0.171
(0.377)

0.040

0.076
0.605
0.0031

State
RD Index
Z-Score
P90/P50
P50/P10
Coeff. Of Variance
Log(Income of Husband)
Unemployment Rate
# Child under 1
# Child under 3
# Children under 18
# Persons in the Family
Age
Education
High School Graduate
College Graduate

0.569
(0.445)
0.175
(0.926)
1.723
(0.177)
2.401
(0.656)
0.531
(0.074)
10.004
(0.612)
0.057
(0.019)
0.076
(0.269)
0.260
(0.500)
2.086
(1.414)
4.304
(1.506)
33.886
(5.770)
12.314
(2.470)
0.780
(0.414)
0.136
(0.342)
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0.084
0.525
0.013
-0.033
0.022
0.000
-0.016
-0.494
-0.475
-0.790
0.763
0.113
0.071

Table 3. Effects of Men’s Income Inequality on Women’s Labor Supply

Index
Index_Squared

Relative Deprivation
Census
State
**
**
0.140
0.168
(8.08)
(7.56)
**
**
-0.096
-0.112
(14.51)
(12.94)

Z-Score
Census

**

Z-Score
Z-Score squared/10
**

**

-0.130
(-11.15)
**
0.0106
(8.76)
*
0.1960
(2.36)
*
-0.0108
(-2.24)
0.0020
(1.56)
**
-0.0055
(-6.86)
**
-0.0910
(-10.44)
**
-0.2149
(-42.85)
**
-0.0842
(-22.34)
**
0.0313
(8.90)
**
-0.2395
(-5.48)
**
0.0753
(5.87)
**
-0.0771
(-6.23)
**
0.0298
(18.95)
**
0.7939
(4.59)
101303
0.103

State

0.2828
0.2304
(4.59)
(4.23)
**
**
-0.0258
-0.0230
Ln(Husband’s Income) Squared
(8.64)
(7.56)
†
0.0022
Age of Husband/100
0.0021
(1.73)
(1.62)
**
**
-0.0052
-0.0051
Education of Husband/10
(6.48)
(6.42)
**
**
-0.0922
-0.0921
# Child under 1
(10.54)
(10.56)
**
**
-0.2153
-0.2151
# Child under 3
(42.82)
(42.89)
**
**
-0.0844
-0.0846
# Children under 18
(22.39)
(22.42)
**
**
0.0320
0.0317
# Persons in the Family
(9.02)
(9.09)
**
**
-0.2462
-0.2445
Age
(5.59)
(5.62)
**
**
0.0772
0.0767
Age Squared/10
(5.97)
(6.01)
**
**
-0.0788
-0.0784
Age Cubed/1000
(6.33)
(6.36)
**
**
0.0294
0.0293
Education
(18.60)
(18.71)
*
*
-0.6479
-0.6707
Unemployment Rate (State)
(2.48)
(2.40)
Observations
101303
101303
Pseudo R-squared
0.103
0.103
t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Robust Standard Errors are used to calculate t-statistics.
Regressions include dummy for Census Region or State, husband’s age group, each year and for high
school and college graduates.
Ln(Income of Husband)
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**

-0.099
(-8.98)
**
0.0079
(6.42)
*
0.2973
(2.45)
*
-0.0182
(-2.71)
0.0019
(1.46)
**
-0.0054
(-6.72)
**
-0.0913
(-10.48)
**
-0.2151
(-42.91)
**
-0.0845
(-22.42)
**
0.0317
(9.00)
**
-0.2420
(-5.53)
**
0.0760
(5.92)
**
-0.0777
(-6.27)
**
0.0299
(19.03)
**
0.0292
(4.72)
101303
0.103

Table 6. Differences in Reaction to Income Inequality by Class
Upper Income Group1

P90/P50 of Men’s Wage
CV of Men’s Wage
P50/P10 of Men’s Wage

Observations

Mid Income Group2

Low Income Group3

Census

State

Census

State

-0.0125

-0.0072

0.0510

*

0.0375

(-0.35)

(-0.25)

(2.34)
*

-0.0661

-0.0140

0.1028

(-0.74)

(-0.21)

(2.30)
**

*

(2.25)
0.0764

*

(2.21)
**

Census

State

-0.0125

-0.0072

(-0.35)

(-0.25)

-0.0661

-0.0140

(-0.74)

(-0.21)

-0.0061

-0.0029

-0.0061

-0.0029

-0.0099

(-1.06)

(-0.96)

(-2.88)

(-3.09)

(-1.06)

(-0.96)

13077

13077

50477

50477

13077

13077

1

-0.0077

. Upper Income Group: Husband’s Income > P90 in the Husband’s Age & Region Group
2
. Middle Income Group: Husband’s Income Falls between P90 and P50
3
. Lower Income Group: Husband’s Income < P50 in the Husband’s Age & Region Group
Robust Standard Errors are used to calculate t-statistics.
Regressions include dummy for Census Region or State, husband’s age group, each year and for high school and college graduates.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1
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